From 54159d1d93237612239f19653f6a99b8a62708b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Qvist Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 10:40:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Cleanup --- RNS/Transport.py | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/RNS/Transport.py b/RNS/Transport.py index 6cc74700..826e44a5 100755 --- a/RNS/Transport.py +++ b/RNS/Transport.py @@ -2077,7 +2077,7 @@ class Transport: if packet.packet_type == RNS.Packet.ANNOUNCE: name_hash = packet.data[RNS.Identity.KEYSIZE//8:RNS.Identity.KEYSIZE//8+RNS.Identity.NAME_HASH_LENGTH//8] if len(name_hash) != RNS.Identity.NAME_HASH_LENGTH//8: return packet.receiving_interface.protocol_violation(f"Malformed announce packet with size {len(packet.data)}") - if len(raw) > RNS.Reticulum.MTU: return packet.receiving_interface.protocol_violation(f"Excessive announce packet frame size of {len(raw)} bytes") if packet.receiving_interface else None + if len(raw) > RNS.Reticulum.MTU: return packet.receiving_interface.protocol_violation(f"Excessive announce packet frame size of {len(raw)} bytes") if len(packet.receiving_interface.held_announces) >= packet.receiving_interface.ic_max_held_announces: return None if Transport.blocked_destination_types and name_hash in Transport.blocked_destination_types: return @@ -2095,9 +2095,9 @@ class Transport: elif announce_signature_valid == "no_stamp": return None elif announce_signature_valid == "invalid_stamp": return None elif not announce_signature_valid: - return packet.receiving_interface.protocol_violation(f"Invalid announce signature for {RNS.prettyhexrep(packet.destination_hash)}") if packet.receiving_interface else None + return packet.receiving_interface.protocol_violation(f"Invalid announce signature for {RNS.prettyhexrep(packet.destination_hash)}") - elif packet.receiving_interface != None: packet.receiving_interface.received_announce(size=len(packet.raw)) + else: packet.receiving_interface.received_announce(size=len(packet.raw)) Transport.announce_rxc += 1 announced_destination_known = packet.destination_hash in Transport.path_table @@ -2118,10 +2118,10 @@ class Transport: elif packet.destination_hash == Transport.pr_destination_hash: if traffic_class < Transport.TC_PATH_REQUEST: traffic_class = Transport.TC_PATH_REQUEST if not len(packet.data) >= RNS.Identity.TRUNCATED_HASHLENGTH//8: return - elif len(packet.data) > Transport.PR_STAMPED_LENGTH: return packet.receiving_interface.protocol_violation(f"Excessive path request size of {len(packet.data)} bytes") if packet.receiving_interface else None + elif len(packet.data) > Transport.PR_STAMPED_LENGTH: return packet.receiving_interface.protocol_violation(f"Excessive path request size of {len(packet.data)} bytes") else: pr = Transport.parse_path_request(packet.data) - if pr == None: return packet.receiving_interface.protocol_violation("Tagless path request", level=RNS.LOG_PATHING) if packet.receiving_interface else None + if pr == None: return packet.receiving_interface.protocol_violation("Tagless path request", level=RNS.LOG_PATHING) else: destination_hash = pr[0] tag_bytes = pr[2] @@ -2130,7 +2130,7 @@ class Transport: pr_length = len(packet.data) if pr_length != Transport.PR_STAMPED_LENGTH and pr_length != Transport.PR_LENGTH and pr_length != Transport.PR_LEGACY_LENGTH: # TODO: Only allow stamped size after transition - if packet.receiving_interface: return packet.receiving_interface.protocol_violation(f"Invalid path request size {pr_length}", level=RNS.LOG_PATHING) + return packet.receiving_interface.protocol_violation(f"Invalid path request size {pr_length}", level=RNS.LOG_PATHING) unique_tag = destination_hash+tag_bytes @@ -2175,7 +2175,7 @@ class Transport: if not stamp_ok: if Transport.STAMPS_ENFORCED: return - if packet.receiving_interface: packet.receiving_interface.received_path_request(size=len(raw)) + packet.receiving_interface.received_path_request(size=len(raw)) Transport.pr_rxc += 1 if interface.should_ingress_limit_pr(): traffic_class = Transport.TC_INGRESS_LIMITED