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Allow tools to be symlinks and hardlinks

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This commit is contained in:
Andrea Mazzoleni 2026-06-11 23:26:44 +02:00
parent 7ef3c2bf80
commit bb39c6ca3d
1 changed files with 1 additions and 11 deletions
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12
cmdline/unix.c
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@ -102,8 +102,6 @@ void os_signal_init(void)
* be group-writable by a group other than the daemon's real/effective GID.
* - The file must be a regular file with at least one execute bit set.
* - The setuid and setgid bits must not be set.
* - The file must not have more than one hard link, to prevent an attacker
* from linking a controlled file into a trusted directory.
* - On systems with fexecve(2) support, the returned fd is opened without
* O_CLOEXEC so it can be passed directly to fexecve(2). On other systems
* O_CLOEXEC is set and execve(2) must be used with @resolved_path.
@ -195,9 +193,8 @@ static int verify_executable(const char* exec_path, char* resolved_path)
/*
* Open the executable
* O_NOFOLLOW prevents following symlinks to mitigate redirection attacks
*/
int fd = openat(dir_fd, exec_name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW
int fd = openat(dir_fd, exec_name, O_RDONLY
#if !HAVE_FEXECVE
| O_CLOEXEC /* with fexecve cannot use O_CLOEXEC (Close on Exec) */
#endif
@ -259,13 +256,6 @@ static int verify_executable(const char* exec_path, char* resolved_path)
return -1;
}
/* verify the file has not been hardlinked multiple times */
if (st.st_nlink > 1) {
log_error(EINVAL, "File %s has multiple hard links", resolved_path);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
return fd;
}