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Author SHA1 Message Date
lrnselfreliance
8edace08bd
Python packages install from hash-locked requirements; yt-dlp still floats (#913)
* Python packages install from hash-locked requirements; yt-dlp still floats

Every pip install trusted PyPI over TLS: requirements.txt pins only top-level versions
(some with >=), the controller's are almost all >=, and dependencies were never pinned, so
a forged certificate (as the eMudhra key compromise allowed) could change code in the API,
the controller, or the archive container.  scripts/lock_requirements.sh generates a
universal, hash-locked .lock beside each requirements.txt, and
install_python_requirements.sh installs it with --require-hashes at every site.  yt-dlp is
left out of the lock and upgraded afterwards so devices still get YouTube fixes; its
dependencies are locked.  The unpinned `pip install --upgrade pip` steps are gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* The unhashed yt-dlp install cannot replace locked packages, and nothing builds from source

Review of #913 found two holes.  The yt-dlp step ran without --no-deps, so pip's
only-if-needed strategy would still fetch an unhashed dependency whenever yt-dlp's metadata
asked for a version the lock did not install.  And srt is published only as a source
archive, whose build installed setuptools with hash checking off on every install.

The yt-dlp step now uses --no-deps (its dependencies come only from the lock), both steps
are retried as the image builds did before, and installs and locks are wheels-only.  srt
3.5.3 is vendored unmodified as wrolpi/vendor/srt.py (MIT), verified against the sdist
hash the lock pinned; webvtt-py's SRT reader rejects WROLPi's own test file, so it is not
a replacement.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:00:39 -07:00
lrnselfreliance
d69f8317aa
serve, single-file and readability-extractor install from a committed lockfile (#912)
They were installed with `npm i -g`, which pinned only the three top-level versions and
resolved their 156 dependencies fresh from the registry, so a forged TLS certificate (as
the eMudhra key compromise allowed) could change code WROLPi runs on every archive.
npm-tools/package-lock.json pins every package with its sha512, and install_npm_tools.sh
runs `npm ci` and links the commands into /usr/local/bin for every install path, upgrades,
both images and the archive container.  The app container's unpinned, unused global serve
is removed.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-31 10:39:08 -06:00
lrnselfreliance
ecdad6c3e0
Caddy's apt repository is trusted through the key committed with WROLPi (#911)
The install scripts, the nginx-to-Caddy upgrade, and the Pi image downloaded Caddy's apt
signing key and source list over TLS and trusted them as-is, so a forged certificate could
serve a key that signs other caddy packages.  add_caddy_apt_repo.sh installs the key the
ISO already uses (fingerprint 65760C51EDEA2017CEA2CA15155B6D79CA56EA34) as an armored
keyring and names it in the source's signed-by.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-31 10:22:19 -06:00
lrnselfreliance
ad56134851
install.sh installs on Debian 13 (#830)
install.sh only accepted Debian 12, which cannot run this version, and
rejected Debian 13.  It now requires Debian 13 or newer on both PCs and
Raspberry Pis.  The install scripts point to the drive wizard instead of
manual mounting.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 15:51:40 -06:00
Renamed from scripts/install_debian_12.sh (Browse further)